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This paper extends the theory of optimal taxation and government 
production to open economies. Appropriate rules for project evaluation 
and the determination of consumption, production, and trade taxes 
under a variety of restrictions (e.g., less than 100 percent profit taxes, 
government budget constraint, foreign exchange constraint) are derived. 
Among the results are (a) international prices should be used for 
evaluating public projects, unless there is a government budgetary con- 
straint or there is a quota (this result does not require that tariff rates be 
optimally chosen); (b) no tariff should be levied on intermediates and 
only consumption taxes should be employed if there are 100 percent 
profit axes. If profits are not taxed at 100 percent, both consumption and 
trade taxes should be employed. 
1. Introduction 
1. 1. Motivation 
In this paper we address ourselves to two questions: (1) In an open 
economy, in which the government is pursuing various trade and tax 
policies, and where some of the policy instruments are optimally chosen 
but the others are not, and in which, as a consequence, domestic price 
ratios differ from international price ratios, what is the appropriate 
relationship between international prices, domestic prices, and shadow 
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prices in benefit-cost analysis? (2) Under what conditions is it optimal 
to impose taxes on imports and exports which are different from those 
imposed on domestically produced commodities, and what is the optimal 
tariff structure in these circumstances? 
The motivation behind these questions is probably transparent. Much 
of the recent discussion on benefit-cost analysis (in particular, Little and 
Mirrlees [1969] and Dasgupta, Marglin, and Sen [1972]) has been aimed 
at a detailed specification of the procedure that governments ought to 
follow in choosing industrial projects in the public sector. But neither of 
the two documents referred to above presents a fully articulated model 
for arriving at the detailed recommendations. It is, therefore, of some 
importance to check the kinds of circumstances under which these 
recommendations are indeed appropriate. 
The second set of questions that we are concerned with here, on the 
other hand, is closely related to the recent literature on effective pro- 
tective rates (see, e.g., Corden 1966; Ruffin 1969). The interest in this 
concept was presumably motivated by asking the question, What structure 
of tariffs leaves undistorted the relative prices of different commodities 
and factors of production? But the converse of the well-known proposition 
that in general equilibrium it is only relative prices that are determined 
is that, without changing relative prices, a (nonlump-sum) tax system 
can raise no revenue. A more limited objective seems to have been the 
search for a tariff system which will leave undistorted relative commodity 
prices (but which will in general change relative factor prices and prices 
of commodities relative to factors). But it is pertinent to ask why one should 
be interested in a tariff structure that leaves relative commodity prices, or 
even relative supplies of different commodities, unchanged. We know 
that most taxation is distortionary. The relevant question is, If you must 
have distortions, what is the best set of distortions to have?' 
1.2. The Open Economy 
Some years ago Pigou (1947) attempted to extend to economies that trade 
the basic principles of optimal taxation that Ramsey (1927) had earlier 
described for economies that do not trade. Ramsey had, for instance, 
argued that, in the case of independent demand and supply curves,2 for 
small government revenue, taxes ought to be proportional to the sum of 
' These are questions in the theory of the "second best," a subject of much discussion 
in recent years. Although the first extensive discussion of "second-best" welfare economics 
was that of Meade (1955), the first real exercise in second-best welfare economics was 
probably that of Ramsey (1927). This paper is an extension to an open economy of 
the problems of optimal taxation discussed by Boiteux (1956), Diamond and Mirrlees 
(1971), Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1972), and Mirrlees (1972). 
2 That is, where the demand and the supply for a commodity depends only on the 
price of that commodity (relative to, say, the price of labor). 
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the inverse of the demand and supply elasticities.3 Since the supply 
elasticity of foreign commodities is presumed in general to be greater 
than that for domestically produced commodities, Ramsey's analysis 
implied that, rather than impose a surtax, that is, impose a higher tax, 
on imports than on domestically produced goods, one should tax imports 
at a lower rate. But Pigou did not answer the question as to what ought 
to be done for commodities which are both domestically produced and 
imported. One would wish to know if the two activities ought to receive 
differential treatment. 
There are, moreover, some important differences between taxation 
policy in closed economies and that in open economies, and it is not 
immediately apparent, when proper account of this is taken, whether 
Pigou's conclusions remain valid. Three differences come immediately to 
mind: 
1. For imported goods, the producer surplus which accrues to pro- 
ducers of commodities which are not in perfectly elastic supply accrues 
to nationals of other countries and, accordingly, does not affect domestic 
welfare. For domestically produced goods it does. 
2. Many countries face what is sometimes referred to as a "foreign 
exchange constraint." This implies that the earnings from export do not 
measure their social value, and the cost of imports does not measure the 
social cost. To what extent this should affect the rates at which different 
imports should be taxed, and whether this should result in governments' 
using, in benefit-cost analysis, prices that are different from those that 
rule at the border are questions that are still often debated. To see what 
is involved, consider an open economy in which there are no barriers to 
trade or to the flow of capital. If pi, is the international price of com- 
modity i at time t, and zi, is the net import of commodity i at t, then 
trade balance requires only that 
Z pitzit = 0. (1.1) it i 
A "foreign exchange" constraint imposes an additional condition: in any 
particular year, t, for instance, the deficit may not be larger than so much, 
say, Et. That is,4 
v it;zit <:: 8t- (1.2) 
3 Some of the assumptions implicit in Ramsey's analysis, e.g., the nontaxation of 
profits, have recently been made explicit (see Stiglitz and Dasgupta 1971). 
4 Perhaps a more realistic way of writing the constraint is that the cumulative deficit 
at time t be less than some number, Et 
A,- izr < ti- T~t i 
This complicates the mathematics but does not affect the qualitative results given in 
section 7. 
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This is equivalent to saying that the country cannot borrow more than a, 
from abroad in any given year. The foreign exchange constraint (1.2) is 
binding if and only if the country would like to borrow more than it can, 
which in turn implies that there is a constraint on the supply of investible 
funds (in other words, a savings constraint). If, as the analysis seems to 
suggest, the savings and foreign exchange constraints are in fact closely 
related, it is pertinent to ask whether it is fair to argue that the foreign 
exchange constraint does not affect relative prices used in benefit-cost 
analysis while the savings constraint does.5 
3. Although most governments do use excise and specific commodity 
taxes on domestic consumption to a limited extent, they are usually 
justified in terms of distributional objectives (e.g., taxing luxuries, like 
perfumes), in terms of merit wants (e.g., cigarettes and tobacco) or 
externalities, or as benefit taxes (e.g., gasoline). On the other hand, almost 
all countries impose extensive import duties at varying rates, and both the 
commodities taxed at the border and the rates at which they are levied 
have probably less to do with welfare considerations than with the 
strength of various pressure groups. 
To put the matter differently, the conventional planning literature 
treats the "government" as if it were a single unit, the central planning 
agency being the basic coordinating body. It simultaneously decides on 
taxes, tariffs, and investment projects. Although this assumption has its 
merits-it allows one to pose a number of questions in their most pristine 
form-it is doubtful whether it makes for a good theory of government 
action.' To take an example, suppose that project X requires equipment 
E as an input which it is optimal to import (since domestic production of 
E is too costly). If E is in fact imported, then assume X is a desirable 
project. But the government project evaluator may know that if X is 
undertaken there will be powerful pressure groups at work forcing the 
departments responsible for levying tariffs to raise the tariff on E so as to 
enable private domestic producers to produce more of it domestically to 
meet the augmented demand for it. What, then, should the decision be 
with regard to X? It does not seem apparent to us, at least, whether, 
in a closely interdependent economy, a nonoptimal tariff on one com- 
modity should affect the tariffs and shadow prices of other commodities. 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that tariffs, whether optimally chosen 
or not, should generally be neglected for the purpose of benefit-cost 
analysis.7 One of the purposes of this paper is to investigate the kinds of 
circumstances under which this argument is correct. 
5 See Little and Mirrlees (1969) for a discussion of this. 
6 See Sen (1972) for a lucid discussion of this range of issues. 
7 See, in particular, Little and Mirrlees (1969). 
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In order to bring out the principles involved as clearly as possible, we 
consider in the following sections a sequence of models, in each of which 
the powers of the planner are somewhat more circumscribed than in the 
previous. In section 2, the only constraint on the government is the 
impossibility of lump-sum taxation. The government can impose 100 
percent profit taxes and taxes on all production, consumption, and trade. 
In section 3, we then consider the consequences of the government not 
being able to impose 100 percent profit taxes. In section 4, we further 
restrict the government in allowing it to impose only trade taxes. In 
section 5, some of the trade taxes are assumed given, and quotas are 
assumed to be imposed on some commodities; but the government must 
still make decisions concerning the choice of investment projects and the 
rates of tariffs on the remaining commodities. In section 6, the con- 
sequences of trade policy partially dependent on project selection are 
explored. In section 7, the consequences of a foreign exchange constraint 
are considered, while in section 8 those of a budgetary constraint on the 
government are investigated. In section 9, we indicate briefly how 
distributional considerations may be integrated with our analysis. 
Finally, in section 10, we summarize the major conclusions of the paper 
in terms of a set of rules.8 
Before setting out, we note three assumptions which will limit the 
generality of our conclusions: (1) We shall assume that every commodity 
is either tradeable at a fixed international price or not tradeable at all. 
This not only simplifies the mathematics, but also allows us to separate 
the tax revenue-welfare effects of concern here with the terms of trade 
effects, which have been the focus of the optimal tariff literature so far. 
(2) We shall assume that the only "distortions" in the economy are those 
introduced by government tax policy; otherwise, prices of factors and 
goods are competitively determined. Accordingly, there is, for instance, 
no unemployment. The presence of other distortions, for example, 
unemployment, undoubtedly would introduce discrepancies between 
market prices and shadow prices, whether there were tariff distortions 
or not.9 (3) For most of the analysis, we shall assume all individuals to 
8 The two authors who have come closest to discussing the issues on tariff policy 
presented here are Meade (1955) and Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1968). The model 
considered by Ramaswami and Srinivasan may be viewed as a special case of that 
presented here, for they are concerned exclusively with an economy in which only 
border taxes can be levied (a circumstance we discuss in section 4). Moreover they do 
not allow for the possibility of public production. Their conclusion that duties need 
not be uniform in a second-best revenue tariff is reestablished here (section 4.1) and the 
precise formulae for the optimum tariffs are given. For an excellent recent survey see 
Bhagwati (1971). 
9 For an analysis of this class of situations see Marglin (1972) and Stiglitz (1973; 
in press). 
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be identical. This means that we will not investigate the implications 
for tariffs and shadow prices of the interaction between savings and 
income distribution. 
All of these raise important problems which we hope to pursue else- 
where. 
2. The Fully Controlled Economy 
In this section, we consider an economy in which there are no foreign 
exchange constraints and no trade and domestic distortions apart from 
those which the government deliberately imposes. The only constraint 
imposed upon the government is the unfeasibility of its employing lump- 
sum taxes. The government's problem is to decide what taxes to impose 
on domestic producers, what tariffs to levy on imports (both intermediate 
and final commodities), what excise taxes to set on domestic consumption, 
and which projects to undertake. It wishes to do this in such a way that all 
markets clear, trade balances, and welfare is maximized. 
2. 1. Notation 
We introduce the following notation: 
c, = consumption of the ith commodity (for factors supplied, ci < 0) ;1 0 
yi= production of commodity i by domestic private industry (for factors 
used by private industry < 0); 
yl= production of commodity i by the jth private producer; 
qi= consumption price of commodity i; 
Pi= producer price of commodity i. When different producers face 
different prices for the same commodity, the price is denoted as pi 
zi= net import of commodity i. If it is a net export, then zi < 0; 
Vi= net output of commodity i in the public sector. If it is a net input, 
then xi < 0; 
ti= tax on the import of commodity i; 
F1 = tax on producers of commodity i (when different producers face 
different taxes, the tax is denoted by Fr); 
Ti= difference between the international price for commodity i and the 
domestic producer price. 
Where there is no risk of ambiguity we shall denote a vector, say (ci), 
simply by c. The scalar product of two vectors, say q and c, will be de- 
noted by q * c. Occasionally we shall denote by [i] a square matrix with 
typical element tlik- 
I0 These commodities may be time dated, so the results are valid for the intertemporal 
case as well as the static case. 
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Not all commodities are tradeable, neither are all commodities con- 
sumable. We shall denote by A the set of all commodities in the economy; 
by T the set of all tradeable commodities; by N the set of all nontradeable 
commodities; by D the set of all domestically produced commodities (some 
of which still might be traded); by I the set of all intermediate goods; 
and by C the set of all consumption goods. Thus A = C u I = T u N, 
C n I = 0, T n N = 0, N c D. Our numeraire good will be indexed 
as i = 0. For notational simplicity, we shall suppose, unless noted 
otherwise, that it is at the same time traded, domestically produced, and 
consumed. Our units are chosen so that the international price of every 
traded commodity is unity. 
2.2. Basic Relations 
There are a few simple relations among the variables defined in section 
2.1 which we set forth here. To begin with, the commodity balance 
equations are: 
ci =YA + xi + Zi, (2.1) 
where it is understood that zi = 0 for i e N; ci = 0 for i e I; and 
xi = yi = 0 for i ? D. 
The total outputyi from domestic private firms is 
= A i e D. (2.2) 
Now domestic consumption prices equal international prices plus the 
taxes on traded goods. We then have 
qi = pi + Fi = 1 + ti ieCr TnD, (2.3a) 
qi = Pi + Iri i e C n N, (2.3b) 
qi = 1 + ti i e C n Tand i ? D, (2.3c) 
pi + F =I + ti i e T r D n I. (2.3d) 
In other words, 
F1-i ti = Ti = 1 -pi i ET n D. (2.3e) 
Thus, ti > 0 for a tariff on an import or a subsidy on an export, ti < 0 
for a tariff on an export (i.e., an export tax) or a subsidy on an import, 
Ti > 0 for a production tax in excess of the tariff, - ti < Ti < 0 for a 
production tax that is less than the tariff. If Ti = -ti, domestic production 
is neither taxed nor subsidized (qi = pi). 
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2.3. Consumer Behavior 
Throughout the discussion (except in section 9) we shall suppose that all 
individuals are identical. We shall, therefore, talk of the "representative" 
individual. He is assumed to maximize his utility, 
max U(c), (2.4) 
subject to his budget constraint, 
q-c = M, (2.5) 
where M is his income. If there are no lump-sum taxes or subsidies, then 
M is just equal to profits (pure rents) after tax. If 7iJ denotes the net 
profit of thejth firm, and i, denotes the tax rate on profits, then 
M= Z(I - ,T)7tj = (1 -T,,)7, where t = sir'. (2.6) 
I I 
The solution to (2.4) may be written as 
V(q, M) = max * U, (2.7) 
where V is known as the consumer's indirect utility function. 
2.4. Behavior of Firm 
There are m different private firms in the economy. For simplicity, we 
assume that all firms face strictly concave production functions.11 
F1(y1) = 0 j = 1,..., m. (2.8) 
The jth firm maximizes profits at the given price vector pi: 
max pJ .yJ subject to FJ(yi) = 0. (2.9) 
The solution to (2.9) is denoted by 7tj(p). 12 Moreover, in equilibrium 
it will be the case that 
pi= aF'/a i, k e D. (2.9a) 
These equations can be solved for the supply of commodities (demands 
for factors) as a function of p1.1 3 
yj =yk(pJ)- (2.9b) 
" As we have shown elsewhere (Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1972) there is no important 
loss of generality by assuming strict concavity. See Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1972) and 
Mirrlees (1972) for a discussion of some possible anomalies. 
12 It has become customary in the literature on general equilibrium to refer to 7rJ 
as the net profit for the jth firm (see, in particular Debreu [1959]), whereas, of course, 
it denotes what has traditionally been referred to as "pure rents" accrued by the firm. 
We stick to the modern usage here largely because it sounds more reasonable to say 
that a firm is concerned with maximizing profits rather than its rents. 
1 Note that, if we had a constant returns to scale function, then we could solve for 
relative factor intensities, but not for total factor demands without knowing quantities 
produced. See, however, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1971). 
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Indeed, it is a well-known result that 
07r' 
alp j = Yk (2.9c) api 
One other fact will be of use: Differentiating the production constraint, 
we obtain 
aF- ai aFi/ayi o aY4- E4 a. (2.9d) 
2.5. Trade Balance 
The condition for the balance of trade may be written as 
B= Z, Zk =Z (Ck -yk- Xk) 0. (2.10) 
keT keT 
Thus, we can view B as a function of q, p, and x: 
aB aCk (2.10a) 
aqj kETaqi 
= B i E aCk aYk (2.1Ob) 
api keT asr keT api 
aB = -1. (2.1Oc) 
aXk 
2.6. The Government 
The government's production function we shall denote by 
G(x) = 0. (2.11) 
As equation (2.11) indicates, we are tacitly supposing that the public 
sector is concerned with the transformation of the same set of goods as the 
domestic private sector is. We assume this simply for notational ease. 14 
14 We are supposing, then, that there are no public goods in this economy. If we were 
to assume that the public sector produces public goods as well we would obtain one set 
of first-order conditions in addition to the sets of conditions obtained below. This 
additional set would dictate the optimum supply of public goods. For a discussion of the 
implications of such a condition see Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Stiglitz and 
Dasgupta (1971). Our concern here is with obtaining shadow prices of private goods; 
and it is trivial to show that the results derived here apply without modification to the 
case where public goods are also produced by the government. For this reason we ignore 
public goods here. Similarly, there may be several production units in the public sector. 
But the result derived earlier in Boiteux (1956), Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), and 
Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), that the public sector should always be productively 
efficient, remains valid. To keep the notation simple we have therefore amalgamated 
all public sector production units into one single unit. 
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We shall suppose that the government controls trade and private 
production, but only indirectly through tax and tariff policies. The prob- 
lem before the planning agency is straightforward: it wishes to maximize 
the welfare V of the representative consumer subject to the private sector 
production possibility curves (2.8); the public sector production possi- 
bility curve (2.1 1); the balance of payments condition (2.10); and the 
market clearing equations for the nontraded goods. The government's 
controls are direct government production, tariffs, and consumption, 
production, and profits taxes. But it is easy to establish (using [2.3]) that 
controlling taxes and tariffs is essentially equivalent to controlling pro- 
ducer and consumer prices, and it turns out that the latter are concep- 
tually and analytically easier to use. Similarly, although controlling p, 
q, and x determines z, so that the only constraint on the traded goods 
is the balance of payments constraint (i.e., we do not need to impose 
separate market clearing constraints on each of the traded commodities), 
it is convenient to formulate the problem as if z were control variables 
and impose the additional market clearing equation for each of the 
traded goods.'5 Finally, we note (see Stiglitz and Dasgupta 1971) that 
optimality requires the government to set Ti = 1, provided the govern- 
ment requires some resources to be raised by distortionary taxes. In view 
of the fact that the analysis is trivial in those cases where the government 
does not need to impose distortionary taxes to raise its revenue, we set 
= 1 whenever it is assumed to be feasible. For the remainder of this 
section we suppose that it is. 
Finally, we normalize by setting qO = 1 and pi = 1 for all].' 6 
15In other words, the problem 
max V[q, 7r(l - zN,,)] + Ai (Xk + Yk -k)] 
{x, p,q) k E T 
m 
+ E Pk(Xk + Ak - Ck) + uG+ ?E vjFJ(yJ) 
keN j1= 
and the problem 
max V[q,7r(l - lo)] - A E Zk + E Pk(Zk + Xk + Yk - Ck) + G + E vjFJ(yi) 
{x,p,q,z} keA j= 1 
are equivalent. When the outputs and inputs are viewed as functions of producer prices, 
the production constraints (2.8) are already embedded in the problem (through 2.9), 
and hence we could omit the term 
m 
E 'PjFj(yi) 
in our Lagrangian expression. In the centralized problem, where outputs and inputs 
are considered as direct controls, this term must be retained. For purposes of symmetry 
with the centralized problem, we retain the production constraints explicitly within our 
Lagrangian expression. 
16 For a discussion of these normalizations, see Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1972). 
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2.7. Optimal Public Policy 
We now form the Lagrangian of the problem 17 
m 
Y = V(q, 0) - )B + jiG + E fjFj(yJ) 
j=l 
+~~~ 
+ E Pk (E k + Xk x FZk -Ck1 . (2.12) 
k e A j = 1 
We obtain the first-order conditions: 
a 
V/ E Pk k = 0 i e C and i : O. (2.13) 
~qi kkeC aqi 
aFj +=Pk -=0 ieDandi O.0 j= 1,...m, 
k ED ok OP4 
(2.14) 
Pip =? i E D, (2.15) 
axi 
and 
-i+ Pi = ie T. (2.16) 
From equations (2.14-2.16) we obtain the now-familiar result:18 
aG/ax, Pi~, - IF /ay = p_ I i T n D j =m 
aG/axo Po aFJ/1yJ 
(2.17a) 
and 
- Pi = Pi i e N c D. (2.17b) 
Equations (2.17a) and (2.17b) describe the desirability of overall pro- 
duction efficiency for the economy. All production units in the economy 
ought to use international prices in selecting their optimum techniques, 
and there ought to be no taxes or tariffs on intermediate goods.19 
It is then apparent that, at least in this case, Pigou's (1947) conclusion, 
that domestic production ought to be taxed at a higher rate than imports, 
is incorrect. No differentiation between domestic and foreign production 
should be made. 
'7 We recall the convention adopted in discussing (2.1) that it is understood that 
Ii = 0 for i C N, cl = 0 for i e I,yi = 0, and xi = 0 for i 0 D. 
18 The second equality follows from observing that, for given j, we have, with (2.9d), 
as many equations of the form (2.14) as commodities; since we thus have a system of n 
homogenous equations in n unknowns, we require vj(aFJIavk) + Pk = 0. See Dasgupta 
and Stiglitz (1971) for a more detailed discussion. 
'9 This is the central result in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). For a thorough ex- 
ploration of the application of this result see Little and Mirrlees (1969). 
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Turning to equation (2.13), it is now simple to show that it reduces 
to20 
E k - (- + E -(-) keTnCCi aqk U keN GC )i aqk 
tk d Fk Id =- (. 
1ik -1ik 0 i e C (2.18) 
keTnC qk keNnC qk 
where 
i aM keTnC aM keN / C am 
and 
ai In qjI) 
It follows from equation (2.18) that for small taxes the consumption of all 
commodities is reduced by the same amount (from what it would have 
been had producer prices been charged)."2 
3. Limited Profit Tax on Private Firms 
3.1. General Considerations 
For a number of reasons, no government imposes a 100 percent tax on 
profits. This requires a good deal of modification in the analysis. Now 
profits enter directly into the utility function, and changes in profits 
affect the demands for various goods. For simplicity, we consider the 
20 To confirm the validity of equation (2.18) one uses (2.3a), (2.3b), (2.16), and 
(2.17b) in equation (2.13), and noting that aV/aq1 = -c1(aV/aM), one obtains 
MA 2 k E (qk - tk) ak I (qk - Fk) k = 0 i e C. A. am keCnr)T qikeC rN aq1 
On using Slutsky's equation, the fact that the Slutsky matrix is symmetric, and the fact 
that 
EZOk (y) - 0= k E C aqi 
the foregoing equation reduces, on collecting terms, to the form 
E tk ( ac IFE rk_( acC y ~~~~L keC n T Cir aqk k CnN ki a kk 7Nu 
ii k E- C aM kc-Cn T kaM+ ke E N am 
which immediately yields equation (2.18). 
2 1 Note the difference between this result and the underlying notions of the effective 
tariff literature. There, the focus is on a tariff structure which reduces production of 
each commodity by an equal percentage from the pretax situation and the analysis 
often ignores the change in factor prices of nontraded inputs; here, we reduce. con- 
sumption by an equal percentage from what it would have been with the new producer 
prices; for traded goods, the only change in production results from the change in 
prices of nontraded inputs. 
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polar case where no tax on profits can be imposed. The intermediate cases 
are trivial to work out. 
The Lagrangian now takes the form 
V [, m nj(Pj)J Zk + jG(x) + E Q jFj(yj) 
j=1 k e T j=i1 
+ E Pk A( + Xk + Zk Ck (3.1) 
k E A j= 1 
The first-order conditions now read as: 
E Pk = 0 i e C, i O, (3.2) 
0qj k e C aqj 
a V an O-7 FJ N a ~ - ack h0 
aM ap LIQj .+y Pk I EPk a = ? a~~ap~ ke~~k~ay / ap/ kEC' amv 'ai4 
j = ,...,m, ieDandi # 0, (3.3) 
G 
+ i iD, (3.4) 
axi 
- + Pi i E T. (3.5) 
3.2. All Commodities Tradeable 
Consider, for simplicity, the case where all goods are tradeable. Using 
equation (3.5), we can write equation (3.2) as 
--2. _ - E = 0 i E C andi 0. (3.2a) 
aqj ke C aqj 
Equation (3.2a) has an immediate interpretation. By raising tariffs (con- 
sumer prices), we improve the balance of payments, by discouraging 
imports. The "cost" of this is, of course, a decrease in utility-higher prices 
for consumer goods makes one worse off. There is, therefore, a trade-off 
between "trade surplus" and welfare. Equation (3.2a) reflects the fact 
that the marginal rate of substitution between the two should be the same 
regardless of which price we vary, that is, the loss in welfare per unit 
gain in the balance of payments surplus should, at the margin, be the 
same for all commodity prices.22 Turning to equation (3.3), by using 
(2.9c) and the fact that 
z _F &/k 0 all i 
k e D y kpi 
22 Exactly the same reasoning applies to exports. An export tax lowers the domestic 
price, increases welfare, and, because it increases consumption of the given commodity, 
makes the balance of payments situation worse. 
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we obtain 
*aV a~~~Ck _ k_ 
EM \( 6CM kED pi (3.3a) 
Equation (3.3a) has an interpretation similar to (3.2a). An increase in 
the producer price of an output increases profits and makes the consumer 
better off. It has two effects on the balance of payments: by increasing 
the supply of the commodity it is improved, but by increasing the demand 
(as a result of the higher income from the higher profits) it is deteriorated. 
Equation (3.3a) reflects the fact that at the optimal point the latter effect 
on the balance of payments must dominate the former, and indeed, the 
marginal rate of substitution of gains in welfare and the worsening of the 
balance of payments must be the same, regardless of which producer 
price is varied. 
Equations (3.4) and (3.5) have the following similar interpretation: 
the marginal rate of transformation between two commodities in public 
production must be equal to their relative marginal effects on the balance 
of payments at fixed producer and consumer prices. Thus, aB/@xi = 1; 
the government project evaluator should use international prices in select- 
ing public sector projects. 
To see more precisely what equations (3.2a) and (3.3a) imply for 
the structure of tariffs and taxes, we begin by noting that equation (3.2a) 
reduces to the form 
E Jtk ( ) a = -0 < 0 where i e C. (3.6) 
k E Cci eqk U 
This is the familiar formula for the optimal tax structure obtained earlier 
as equation (2.18). It implies that taxes (tariffs) ought to be such that 
consumption of all commodities is reduced by the same percentage along 
the compensated demand curve from what it would have been had inter- 
national prices been charged. 
To see what equation (3.3a) implies, we note that, from it, we can 
derive the following relationship :23 
vk i tk 0C . i0 > 0 
kED) ap ek k E Ce COqqk U 
j= 1,.. .,m, i e D and e E C. (3.7) 
23 Substituting (3.2a) into (3.3a), and using the fact that aV/aq. =-ce(VaM), 
we obtain 
1 E Cask ack 1 
Ce kEC aqe aMye ap< 
Using the Slutsky equation, we obtain 
Ct kEC aq) E k D aPi Yi 
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Equation (3.7) implies that the percentage change in thejth firm's output 
of the ith commodity or input of the ith factor should be the same for 
all firms, commodities, and factors. Notice that we have included for the 
possibility of intermediate goods. Therefore, as far as producer taxation 
is concerned, one observes that intermediate goods are treated in no way 
different from final consumer goods.24 
To see more clearly what equation (3.7) implies for the structure of 
producer taxes, consider the case where we treat all the private producers 
identically and, hence, can aggregate them together. Define 
Tk Tk PkOY i 
-- -- k = k and tl.k (3.8) 
1 Tk Pk Yai OPk 
Then equation (3.7) can be written in the matrix form 
* [US'] = OE; or ? = OEW [i7'-1) (3.9) 
where E = (1, . . ., 1), a vector with unity everywhere. 
Equation (3.9) provides a simple expression for calculating the optimal 
structure of producer taxes. Notice that only in the limiting case of 
infinite supply elasticities (constant returns to scale) is it optimal to 
impose no tax on domestic production. 
Since a tax-tariff structure affects only relative prices, whether there 
is a tax or subsidy on a particular commodity depends on what we choose 
as our numeraire; that is, the price of a given commodity will rise relative 
to that of some other commodities, fall relative to still others. It follows 
that Pigou's (1947) conjecture that the tax on the output of a given com- 
modity by a domestic producer ought to be higher than the tax on the 
import of the same commodity, is not, in fact, a well-formulated one.25 
A natural choice of numeraire for a small country with a principal export 
crop is that export crop. Then, if the final good is produced by the inter- 
mediate good alone, Tf = 0 (by definition), TI = -0/1, (I - l/pfyf) < 0 
(where if is the supply elasticity of the final good, pf andyf are its price 
and output); that is, a production subsidy (relative to the tariff on the 
good) is imposed on the intermediate good. 
Finally, since 
keD ai' = C 'k (Ilk) = 0 when te C and i e D 
and ayilapl = ayllap1, i, k e D, (ack/aq.) = (tc(/aqk),, k E C, using (2.3), we 
obtain (3.7). 
24 Our general formulation allows us to tax imports of intermediate goods at a different 
rate from domestic production of intermediate goods, and this in fact will in general be 
desirable, since there will be different elasticities associated with each. 
25 The question may be reformulated, as follows: Is it true that qilqo > 0 implies 
PilPo < 1? Consider a change of numeraire to j: Assume that qj/qo > 1, pjlpo < 1. 
Then the signs of (qilqj) - 1 and (Pilpj) - 1 are ambiguous. In particular, it is possible 
for qilqj > 1 while pilpj > 1. 
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3.3. Social Valuation of Private Projects 
In many developing countries, the government also authorizes the con- 
struction of projects in the private sector. Much of benefit-cost analysis 
is directed to an evaluation of these "private" projects. Assume that no 
restrictions are imposed on the government in its tax treatment (except 
the levying of profit axes). Then, from (3.3a), we note that whether the 
kth small project increases welfare depends on the sign of 
_v k +i( yk _EHCk) (.1O am7  )~~Ay-Z Ac) (3.10) 
where Act is the induced increase in consumption. The first term is the 
profits, evaluated at domestic prices, the second term is the effect of the 
project on the balance of payments. Thus, profits at domestic prices must 
exceed the total foreign exchange cost of the project evaluated at the 
shadow price of foreign exchange, X/(8V/8M). 
This may be reformulated: since 
Z qi Ack = nk 
Eyk _ Ck = E, Ai n k C ki ZAyt - Z Ac Z _yk m + Y ti Acti 
Z zk Ayk + E ti ACk - R. 
where Rk is the change in government revenue from trade taxes from the 
project. Thus, we require ink + [I/(aV/aM)]Rk > 0. Profits at domestic 
prices, plus changes in government rade tax revenues, evaluated at the 
shadow price of foreign exchange, [I/(8V/8M)] > 1, must be non- 
negative.26 This makes clear that the criteria sometimes advocated, 
namely, n + R" ? 0, or indeed the criterion E AIy > 0 (that profits 
evaluated at international prices be nonnegative), are both overly 
restrictive. The point is that profits and government revenue should not 
be evaluated at the same set of shadow prices. 
3.4. Nontradeables 
When there are nontradeables, we must include in our calculations the 
change in consumption and production of these commodities. As equa- 
tions (3.4) and (3.5) make clear, nontradeables are to be evaluated in 
terms of their marginal foreign exchange costs. That is, 
= = cG/8 x k e Tand i E N. (3.11) 
e GIOXk 
26 It may be noted that A is the shadow price of foreign exchange in terms of utility 
numeraire, so that ;,/(V/laM) is the shadow price of foreign exchange in terms of 
domestic income. 
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The shadow price of a nontradeable (in utility numeraire) is, therefore, 
equal to the value (at international prices) of the foreign exchange which 
would be generated were one unit less of it produced domestically, and 
instead more units of the tradeables were produced, valued at the shadow 
price of foreign exchange (in utility numeraire). 
The rest of the analysis proceeds easily. One obtains from equations 
(3.2) and (3.3) tax formulae which are similar to equations (3.6) and 
(3.7), except now, for the nontradeables 
ti = qj- Pi i eN nC, (3.12a) 
Ti = Pi-Pi i E N. (3.12b) 
which give the difference between the consumer price and the shadow 
price (eq. [3.12a]) and the difference between the shadow price and the 
producer price (eq. [3.12b]). If we now suppose that there is a single 
producer of a given nontraded good (or that the producers of the good 
can be aggregated) and also assume that the demand and supply curves 
are independent of other prices, we find that the tax levied on a unit of a 
nontraded good is 
q - pi = ti + Ti = 0 15~ + 1i i E N n C. (3.13) 
The formula given in (3.13) is a generalization of the result in Ramsey 
(1927).27 
3.5. Foreign Firms 
In the foregoing analysis we assumed that profits accrued to the nationals 
of the country in which production occurred. In most developing countries, 
a significant part of the profits is repatriated to some foreign country. 
Consider then the case where all profits of a given firm are repatriated. 
These profits do not affect the welfare of the representative consumer 
and, indeed, contribute to the deterioration of the balance of payments 
situation. In this situation, the balance of payments condition reads as: 
E Zk + E ri = Q 
keT jeF 
where F is the set of foreign firms. Suppose again, for ease of exposition, 
that all goods are tradeable. Forj e F we note that the first-order condition 
27 It would perhaps have been more natural to choose as our numeraire labor, a 
nontraded "good." Then, assume we have two methods of obtaining a commodity, 
one by producing it with labor, the other by importing. This is the case that Pigou 
(1947) probably had in mind, and a simple recasting of our results yields the conclusion 
that a surtax is imposed on the domestic production of the commodity. 
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(3.3) can be written as 
am' ( __ Ny 
-s *? Z tv'1 +Pk -=0, jEFand i e D, i 0. a kecD a ap~ 
(3.14) 
On using equations (3.4), (3.5), and (2.9a), in equation (3.14) one obtains 
-yI + Qi , ZPk - + i E - 0, 
k eD aPi k eD aPi 
or using (2.9d) 
= i E D and j e F. 
k eD ai 
An increase in the producer price has, therefore, two effects: it increases 
domestic production, thus reducing the need for imports and improving 
the balance of payments, and it increases profits, which worsens the 
balance of payments (when repatriated). Optimality requires at the 
margin that two effects offset each other. 
Again using (2.9d) and (2.3), we obtain 
TkeEY = 1 i e D andj e F. (3.15) k EDi et O 
Writing IJ = rJi/pfi and J = (Oy7/8pJ) (pk/yi), one obtains from equation 
(3.15) the formula 
= E . [i]-. (3.16) 
One should observe that, as before, industries which have more inelastic 
supply curves should be taxed at a higher rate. More interesting and more 
important is the fact that equation (3.16) implies that the tax rates are 
independent of the government's need for revenue. (This is in contrast 
with the case of domestically owned firms, where the tax rates depend on 
0.) 28 That is to say, the tax rates on the commodities produced by foreign- 
owned firms are determined completely by balance of payments consider- 
ations. This results in the tax rates depending only on the properties of the 
production function of the industry. 
The cost-benefit criterion for accepting projects of foreign-owned 
corporations must similarly be modified. The criterion should be simply 
whether )(-m + E Al) =  [(1 - Pi) Ayi] = 4Z zi Ayh) > 0, that 
is, whether the "surtax" (subsidy) on domestic production yields net tax 
revenue. (This assumes that the project will not affect prices facing other 
firms.) 
28 Compare equation (3.7). 
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4. Inability of Taxing Domestic Production 
4.1. No Profit Taxation 
We now modify the model somewhat to assume that the government can- 
not impose producer taxes. We suppose that the only taxes that are 
feasible are trade taxes. Domestic producers then face the same price 
vector as does the consumer. To keep the notation simple, we suppose 
initially that all goods are tradeable, consumable, and domestically 
produced. That is A = D = T = C. We can again formulate the prob- 
lem as if the controls at the disposal of the government are the domestic 
price vector, q, the vector of public production, x, and the vector of trade 
flows, Z.29 (Note that we must have q = p = 1 + t.) Using the Lagran- 
gian expression (3.1), we now obtain the first-order conditions as 
dV Z Widc - + E E ( - j + Pk E Pk J- dqi j=1 kcA /yk aqi k eC dqi 
i E A and i #O. (4.1) 
OG-+ p=O ieA, (4.2) 
axi 
- + Pi = i e A, (4.3) 
where dV/dqi and dck/dqi are to be regarded as total derivatives.30 Now, 
equations (4.2) and (4.3) together imply once again that international 
prices ought to be used in benefit-cost analysis of public sector projects. 31 
Using this fact we can rewrite equation (4.1) as 
dV ? a ?~k dCki~ni# , 4 dV ,; Ya k _E d_ = 0 i e A and i :A O. ( . 1a) 
dqi k E A qi k EA dqi 
where 
m 
Yk E k - 
j=l 
The interpretation of equation (4.1 a) is as before: the marginal cost 
in welfare per unit gain in the balance of payments should be the same 
regardless of which price (tariff) is varied. Now, since the government 
can be viewed as controlling both trade and public production, and since 
the shadow prices in the public sector are equal to the international prices, 
we can treat trade flow and public production indifferently. Writing 
4k = Ck - Y = Xk + Zk as the "excess demand" or "imports" (from 
29 The actual controls are tariffs, t, and government production x. See above, p. 10. 
30 That is, 
dV/dqi = (aVaq1) + [(a~raqi)(aV/aM)]; dckldqi = (Rcklaqi) + [(air/aq1)(ack/aM)]- 
31 The evaluation of projects in the private sector follows as in the previous section. 
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public production and foreign trade) 32 for commodity k we obtain from 
equation (4.1 a) the fact that 
tk ( Oei) _0 33(4) ZL~~~~~~ - ~~~~~(4.4) 
kAe i 'aqk/D 
where 
0=1 - av1am Z _ tk- 
That is to say, the percentage reduction in "excess demand" should be the 
same for all commodities. 
Now clearly 
a I 
E n ej) dk + Yil (?1, + ?I-d) e = _ _ = '1(1 ?6 a In qk ei 
Therefore, equation (4.4) can be rewritten (on writing i = til= 
til + ti) as 
i, 
[5 e] = i6 + (?)[J] [5S + nd]] = OE (4.5) 
(where I is the identity matrix and E- (1, 1, 1,..., 1)). In equation 
(4.5) (y/e) denotes a vector an element of which is (Yk/ek) We can re- 
express equation (4.5) to obtain the optimal tariff structure as: 
t = OE * = OE [[,fd] + (y/e)*[43 + fld]]l. (4.6) 
We should contrast equation (4.5) with the results of section 3.2, as 
embodied in equation (3.7). 
32 We shall use the quotation marks on "excess demand" or "imports" to signify this. 
33 Equation (4.1a) can be rewritten as: 
av av A a, _ kAyy k = 0 iA 
aq1 aM k aeq k aq1 k aM 
or 
av 
Yk ~~~~ ~~~aCk aCk (x + Zf) a+ A ) (qk- tk) a - A M (qk - tk) AYi - ; 
or 
-A tk [- =-(xi (-\ + z) - - Act + A E tk6i - 
keA aqf aq1 j aM keA aM 
+ Ay, E (qk - tk) aM 
keA a 
= (Xi + Z) (aM + A E tk aM \ am kcA am / 
or, if e1 : 0, 
tke et ( ack 1 av tk> A M0a 
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In the case of independent demand and supply curves, equation (4.6) 
reduces readily to 
11 0 
tj I E 
i 6A. (4.7) 
1lii 6-d + -Li (i + 'Th) 
nei 
The formula given in (4.7) expresses the fact that, at the optimum, the tax 
rate (as a percentage of the consumer price) is inversely proportional to 
the elasticity of "excess demand." Notice also that equation (4.7) implies 
an export tax for exports whose net supply curve is positively sloped, and a 
subsidy for exports whose net supply curve is backward bending. It is clear 
then that duties need not be uniform in this second-best revenue tariff. 34
We turn now to some other cases. For instance, if yi = 0, which 
implies that the commodity does not enter into domestic production, then 
the tariff is identical to that described in section 3.2, as embodied in 
equation (3.7). 
For intermediate goods, yi = -ei, so the tariffs/taxes are chosen to 
make the producers prices the same as discussed in section 3.2 (cf. eq. 
[3.7]). Note that this implies a tariff structure with different rates on 
different commodities, but such that the production of all intermediate 
goods is increased the same percentage; imports of intermediate goods 
not produced domestically are reduced by the same percentage. 
But not even this simplicity of structure obtains if firms are foreign 
owned. For foreign-owned firms, equation (4.4) must be modified to 
read 3 
Etk ( Oei) _ 0 + Y-i (- * + E: t a ) (4.8) 
k c-A ej aOk U ej OM A AM 
Since raising the tariff increases profits, which accrue in this case to 
foreigners and hence hurt the balance of payments, tariffs on commodities 
produced by foreign-owned firms hould be lower than on those produced 
by domestically owned firms (for the same elasticities of the excess demand 
34 See Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1968). 
35 Equation (4.1a) becomes 
lvaYk _aCk~ L 
a,+ AE(YZ- a)_Ayt 0, aq 
q, aq, or 
-Cj M (qk tk) ( yj = o. 
Hence, 
(aA Y aek\ = (aA. tk Ci + Yi + CSa = A a atm + 
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curves); the difference in the percentage reduction in "imports" from 
what they would have been without tariffs is proportional to the ratio of 
domestic production to "imports." 
4.2. Possibility of Taxing Profits at 100 Percent 
There is one further case that deserves brief mention. We now suppose 
that the government can (and therefore, does) set the tax on pure profits 
at 100 percent. Then, (4.1) becomes 
Etk (@ei= _0 Ci .36 (4.9) 
k ei aOk U e1 
This implies that the relative reduction in "excess demand" ("imports") 
is simply inversely proportional to the ratio of "excess demand" ("im- 
ports") to consumption. In particular, in the case of intermediates used to 
produce a nonconsumed export good, note that no tariffs hould be 
imposed on imports. Thus, the conclusion of Ramaswami and Srinivasan 
(1968), that "inputs used in export production must be free of duty" is 
only partially correct:37 if the tax authorities can impose only import 
duties and 100 percent profits taxes, then only if the good is also not 
consumed should it be exempt from duties. If it can impose 100 percent 
profits taxes and consumption-production taxes as well as tariffs, no inter- 
mediate, whether used for producing exports or import substitutes, 
should be taxed. If profits are not taxed at 100 percent, and if the same 
tax rate must be imposed on domestic production as on imported inter- 
mediates, then, even though the good is not consumed, a tariff-production 
tax ought to be imposed. 
5. Benefit-Cost Analysis with Given Taxes 
5.1. All Taxes Fixed 
We now consider the case where the government project evaluator needs 
to take the tariff and tax structure as given and fixed. The question is: 
what shadow prices ought he to use in project evaluation? Notice that the 
number of controls in the planning exercise is now drastically reduced. 
The Lagrangian of the planning problem is still expression (3.1), but now 
the set of controls to be chosen are the vector of public production, x, 
36 The introduction of nontradeables does not change these results. Letting rk- 
(PklI)) - Pk, k E N be the difference between the shadow price and the private producer 
price of a nontradeable, (4.9) can be rewritten 
Ej tk lI + I rk ~i=-Oi k e T (ak Z keN d a =- 
3 Compare Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1968, p. 576). 
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and the volumes of trade, z. If all goods were traded, fixing all taxes 
would fix all consumer and producer prices. Since our focus in this section 
is explicitly on public production, it is convenient to assume there is a 
single public good; resource savings from greater efficiency in the public 
sector can be used to increase the expenditure on the public good. Letting 
g denote the public good, our Lagrangian can now be formulated:38 
= V(q, g) - A E Zk + E Pk(Xk + Zk + Yk - COk) + MG(x, g). 
keT keA 
The first-order conditions now read as 
Vg + yGg- Pk =Ck 0 (5.1) aog 
-i + Pk = k e T. (5.2) 
aG 
Pk + I- = O keD. (5.3) 
aXk 
From equations (5.2) and (5.3), we note that for traded goods the marginal 
rates of transformation in the public sector must equal the international 
price ratios, unity. That is, the project evaluator ought to use inter- 
national prices in project evaluation. Notice that we have not assumed 
that the fixed tax rates are in any sense optimal. For nontradeables, 
we note a result similar to that obtained in section 3.3: the shadow price 
of a nontraded good is its marginal foreign exchange cost. (It is obvious 
that this set of results continues to hold if profits can be taxed up to a 
100 percent.) 
Turning to the "evaluation" of a private domestically owned project, 
the analysis for arbitrary but fixed tariffs and taxes is identical to that 
of section 3 where it was supposed that tariffs and taxes were optimally 
chosen. 
5.2. Some Taxes Controllable 
How does the fact that some tariff rates are unalterable affect the choice 
of the remaining tariff rates? Assume that, for one set of commodities, 
say R, qi can be chosen by the government but that, for the remaining 
goods, they are given as fixed. Assume for notational ease that all goods 
are tradeable, that is, A = T. It is then trivial to confirm, on repeating 
the analysis of section 3.1, that 
E: t k ai) + Zt, (-)a 
- 
-cio i e R. (5.4) 
keR kaqk U koR Vqk U 
38 We assume for notational simplicity in this formulation that the public good is 
not traded, and all other goods are. The reader can easily extend the analysis for the 
situation where there are nontraded private goods in the economy. 
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It follows that the consumption of all freely taxable goods should be 
reduced by the same percentage. This implies that, if demand elasticities 
are assumed independent, the tax rates on those commodities for which 
we can choose tax rates are unaffected. 
5.3. Quotas 
It is not surprising that the presence of quotas alters both the tariff 
structure of the remaining commodities and the shadow prices to be 
used in the public sector for those commodities on which quotas have been 
imposed. To the basic Lagrangian (3.1) we now add an extra term to 
obtain 
, = V q, 7rE ()] E Zk + ItG(X) + E ijFF(y ) 
+ Z Pk (ZAL + Xk + Zk - Ck) + Y(f - z8), (5.5) 
where fS is the quota imposed on commodity s. It is immediate that the 
first-order conditions (3.4) and (3.5) continue to hold here for all i E D 
and i # s. If s enters into domestic production, then the first-order 
conditions pertaining to its shadow price in the public sector read 
OG+ Ps = ?, (5.6) 
0Xs 
i + Ps-y = 0 where y > 0 and y(z-zs) = 0, (5.7) 
from which we obtain the fact that (OG/axs)/(aG/ax0) = 1 + y/) 2 1. 
Generally speaking then, the shadow price of s in the public sector is 
equal to unity only when the quota does not bite. Otherwise itis greater 
than unity. Turning to the structure ofoptimum taxes we note simply that 
both the tariffs and the production taxes are affected. For instance, if 
we assume that tariffs may be chosen on all commodities and that s is 
consumable, then the equation (corresponding to eq. [3.6]) yielding the 
structure of taxes on consumer goods reads as 
Etk (jCi Ys -i 
- -0 i E C. (5.8) 
k eC Ci aOqk Acj iqs D 
In the case of independent demand curves, we notice from equation (5.8) 
that the tariff of only commodity s is altered, and it is set so as to capture 
the profits which would otherwise accrue to the importers of s. Comple- 
ments of s have their consumption reduced proportionately more than is 
the consumption of substitutes. That is to say, the tax structure ought 
to be designed so as to encourage the consumption of substitutes for the 
commodity on which a quota has been imposed. This is clearly what 
intuition suggests. 
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6. Trade Policy Dependent on Project Selection 
Quite often a decision maker realizes that the presence of a particular 
project in the country is likely to give rise to changes in the tariff policy. 
In particular, there is a long experience of newly established industries 
requesting and obtaining protection, even when on "purely economic" 
grounds this protection is questionable. To attempt to capture this kind 
of situation we postulate for simplicity of notation that for some com- 
modity ' the tariff te is an increasing function of the level of imports of 
e. That is, te = te(ze), t' > 0. Assume also for simplicity of notation that 
the model is otherwise the same as that in section 3. The drastic assump- 
tion that we make here, as the reader will immediately recognize, is the 
assuming away of any game theoretic problems that this kind of tariff 
"response" obviously has built within it. We are thus assuming that the 
tariff on 1 responds passively to the level of imports of 1. It is then simple 
to see that the equations corresponding to equations (3.4) and (3.5) read 
here as 
OG-+ P= i ED, (6.1) 
axi 
-i + pi = O i # 1 and icE T, (6.2) 
- - 
ate 
+ pa E Pk ate = (6.3) 
afq 0ze keC aft aOz 
It follows that, for all tradeable goods except {, shadow prices in the 
public sector are their international prices. So far as commodity 1 is 
concerned, we can reexpress equation (6.3) as 
+ ate av + O~~~CkN = .& + - + E ) *(6.4) 
From equation (6.4), we can readily verify that the shadow price of 
commodity 1 is" 
I Ce_ at [ + E ti [( ) ]/ -_ ace at (6.5) 
0z" iec C ce vi D_ aq, 0 z, 
39 aV/am Pk aCk 1 aVlam I lPk - a-k + Z7~~q~c~ - Pk ) qkC a+ e c, -e A +s-EV-q aqe 
aV/lam 1 aCk _1(+ aC( I 
A Ce a q, A aq,, ce 
- )vla a~k aqCk " tk. 
= A + Etk am _ e aq 
E({ k 
A aqt cq U 
This analysis assumes all goods are tradeable. The modifications required if some goods 
are not traded are obvious. 
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It follows from expression (6.5) that the shadow price of commodity t is 
below or above the international price of t depending on whether the given 
tax structure reduces its consumption by less or more than is optimal. In 
particular, if demand curves are independent it depends simply on whether 
tel(1 + to) Q~ t*/10 + te*) -_ 0/qltl 
More generally, it is simple to demonstrate (Dasgupta and Stiglitz 
1971) that, for tradeable commodities, if the tariff on some commodity k 
depends on the level of imports of some other commodity k' as well as 
on, say, the government's net production of yet some other commodity, 
k", then the shadow prices of only k' and k" differ from their international 
prices. It follows from this that the fact that the tariff on commodity k 
responds unoptimally to the import (or the public production) of some 
other commodity k' is no argument for setting the shadow price of k (or 
for that matter any commodity other than k') different from its inter- 
national price. We have found it surprising that this should be so in such 
an interdependent system as we have been considering. 
If demand curves are interdependent, hen the tariffs on other goods 
will, however, be affected by the constraint on the tariff on commodity t.
Just as in the case of quotas, substitutes for commodity e will have their 
production reduced by less than complements. 
7. Foreign Exchange Constraint 
Although the most natural interpretation of the models presented thus 
far is in terms of the conventional models of static international trade, 
there is no reason why the different commodities could not be treated 
as well as dated commodities. As we noted earlier in section 1.2, a foreign 
exchange constraint may be interpreted as a limitation on the amount a 
country can borrow in any period. To make the interpretation clearer, 
we let ci, yj, xi, zit be, respectively, the consumption, net output in the 
private sector, net output in the public sector, and net imports of com- 
modity i at time t. We assume that all relative international prices (within 
each period) are constant, so that we normalize all at unity. Let rt be the 
international rate of interest at t.40 Then the trade balance condition 
can be written as 
E Zit 
i = 0. (7.1) 1 + rt 
The borrowing constraint at some year t' reads as 
Zit < et'. (7.2) 
40 That is, 1/1 + r, is the price today of a promise to deliver $1.00 of foreign exchange 
at time t. 
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 27 
The basic Lagrangian (3.1) now has an extra term, and it reads as 
E Zkt m 
V q, 7r j (pj) k~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1 + pG(x) +1 f i 
E= + rt j=1 
+ EPkt (1,Ykt + Xkt + Zkt - Ckt) 
t k j=l 
+ V t' - E Zkt'), (7.3) 
where Vt, > 0 and 
Yt, , z Zkt') ? 0 
k 
The first-order conditions, corresponding to equations (3.4) and (3.5), 
now read as: 
G-+ P 0 = 0, (7.4) 
exit 
1 + rt =0 t + t', i e T, (7.5) 
Pit, - t'= 0 i E T. (7.6) 1 + rt, 
Equations (7.4-7.6) yield the important implication that within any period 
international prices ought to be used in the evaluation of public sector 
projects. But if the constraint on foreign exchange is binding at t', the 
rate of interest (the rate of discount) at t' should not be rt,; rather, it 
should be somewhat higher than that.4' On the other hand, for non- 
traded goods, the shadow price is simply the value at international prices 
of the foreign exchange that could have been generated if the production of 
the nontraded good had been decreased by a unit and the production 
of traded goods increased. 
If profits are taxed at 100 percent, then it is easy to confirm that the 
private sector ought to face the same set of prices as the public sector. 
That is to say, at the optimum the economy is productively efficient. 
With less than 100 percent profit ax this is no longer true, and indeed the 
rate of discount that should be used for different nontraded goods may 
well be different. 
Turning to the structure of taxes, we note once again that consumption 
of commodities in periods which are substitutes for consumption in periods 
in which the constraint is binding is reduced by less than the consumption 
41 (aGltt aGlaxjt) = PitlPjt = 1; (aG/ax1t)/(aG/axit,) = Puit'pit = ).(1 + rt)/ 
{[)1(1 + r,)] + y.,}. 
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in periods that are complements. That is to say, if the constraint is binding 
for initial years, the tariff structure should be designed so as to encourage 
savings in the initial periods (e.g., by having higher taxes on complements 
of leisure in order to encourage work in initial periods) and a gradual 
lowering of tariffs over time (the substitution effect encouraging the post- 
ponement of consumption). We do not reproduce the formal argument 
here, since it is pretty straightforward. 
8. Budget Constraint 
In this section we consider a constraint on the government budget 
deficit in any given year. For a closed economy, this constraint was looked 
at originally by Boiteux (1956), and his analysis was extended in Stiglitz 
and Dasgupta (1971). 
The constraint may be written as42 
qE qtxit ? bt. (8.1) 
ieD 
If A, is the dual associated with the constraint (8.1) then we have, on 
writing 
it -- ti 
H (1 + rn) 
n = 1 
the simple result 
aG/axi, At + ktqit i, k E D n T. (8.2) 
aGlaXkt it + btqkt 
Without loss of generality, let qit > qkt. Then 
it,> aGlxit> 1. (8.3) 
qkt aGlaXkt 
The shadow prices to be used in the public sector lie between the inter- 
national prices and the domestic prices, regardless of whether the domestic 
prices are determined by optimal or nonoptimal tariffs and taxes. 
Similarly, 
aG__xit =t + btqit (8.4) 
aG/axit+ I (/l + rt+1) + (t+4lqit+ 
42 In writing (8.1), we have implicitly assumed that D = C; for intermediate goods, 
we have to use production prices. This does not change the results at all. 
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If we were to assume q-t = qit+ 1, then 
aG/axj, I (1 + rt+1) as bt+ 1 l . (8.5) 
a~laxit + I5b 1 + rt~1 
Condition (8.5) gives a qualitative rule for choice of the rate of discount 
in the public sector.43 
9. Distributional Objectives 
Thus far we have been assuming the existence of a representative in- 
dividual whose welfare the government is maximizing. It is plain, however, 
that considerations of income distribution ought to weigh heavily both in 
the determination of the structure of taxes and tariffs and in the selection 
of investment projects in the public sector. Assume that the government 
is interested in maximizing the individualistic social welfare function of 
the form W = W(U1, . . ., Ur) where there are r nonidentical individuals 
in the economy. It is then easy to show that corresponding to W there is 
an indirect social welfare function 
V = V(q, M1,... , Mr) (9.1) 
where, if flk is the share of the jth firm owned by individual k, 
Mk = E f3 ic. 
Then, in the analysis of sections 1-8 we simply replace V[q,(l - z,,) * E] 
by the function defined in expression (9.1). It is then easy to show (see 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1971) that, in this instance, even though the struc- 
ture of optimal taxes and tariffs is affected by distributional considerations, 
the basic qualitative propositions concerning public investment criteria 
(i.e., the nature of the shadow prices to be used) remain unchanged. That 
is to say, the government will still use international prices to evaluate 
public projects in those cases where, when we ignored distributional 
objectives, it was optimal to do so.44 
10. Conclusions 
We now summarize the basic results obtained in this paper in the form 
of a few simple rules. 
43 It is, perhaps, of some interest o note that if profits were taxed at 100 percent and 
the only constraint facing the government were the budget constraint (8.1), the optimum 
tax structure would be such that the prices of tradeable goods faced by the private sector 
would be unity. That is to say, at the optimum r1 = 0 for all i (see Dasgupta and Stiglitz 
1971). 
44 For a fairly extensive discussion of the implications of distributional objectives for 
the structure of taxation in a closed economy, see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1973). 
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10.1. Public Investment Criteria 
Rule 1. The public sector ought to use a uniform set of shadow prices 
in all its projects.45 
Rule 2. The shadow price of a tradeable commodity is its international 
price unless (a) there is a government budgetary constraint; (b) there is a 
foreign exchange constraint; (c) there is a quota on that commodity; or 
(d) the level of net imports (or net public production) of that particular 
commodity influences unoptimally some control (e.g., some tariff) at the 
disposal of the government. 46 
Rule 3. When there is a government budgetary constraint, the shadow 
price of tradeable lies between the world price and its domestic price. 
Rule 4. When there is a foreign exchange constraint he relative prices 
of commodities within each period are equal to the world price ratios; 
but the rate of interest used in project evaluation is not equal to the world 
rate of interest. 
Rule 5. When there is a quota on a particular commodity, its shadow 
price should be greater than its international price, if the quota is binding. 
Rule 6. When the net level of imports of a commodity influences its 
tariff level, its shadow price should be greater or less than its inter- 
national price depending on whether as a consequence of the tariff 
response the consumption of the commodity is reduced (from what it 
would have been had the tariff been directly controllable and had been 
at its optimal level) or increased. 
Rule 7. Except under those exceptions noted in rule 2, nontradeables 
ought to be valued at their "foreign exchange" equivalent. That is the 
value of the foreign exchange that would be earned if one less unit of 
the given nontradeable were produced and the resources diverted to the 
production of tradeables. 
What is particularly useful about these results is that they show the 
project evaluator what to do even in "second-best" (optimally chosen 
tariffs and taxes) or "third-best" (nonoptimally chosen tariffs and taxes) 
situations. They show that, even when there are quotas (or similar 
restrictions), although one does not use international prices for the com- 
modities on which there is a quota, for other commodities one does. 
10.2. Tariffs and Taxes 
All the following rules are predicated on the assumption that lump-sum 
taxation is unfeasible, so that the government has to resort o distortionary 
4 5 This does not, of course, pertain to projects at different locations in an economy where 
there are substantial transport costs. As in usual general equilibrium analysis, one would 
then wish to expand the commodity space to account for locational differences. 
46 There is a sense in which (c) may be viewed as a special case of (d). A quota is 
like a discontinuous tariff imposition. 
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taxes to raise revenue. These rules are not dependent on the assump- 
tion of a representative consumer. (Although our analysis employed this 
assumption, a careful reading of the proofs how that it nowhere entered 
the arguments for any of these results, or any of the results cited above.) 
Rule 1. In a centrally controlled economy, or in an economy where 
100 percent profit axes may be levied, and in which consumption, trade, 
and production taxes may be imposed, no taxes (either on trade or on 
domestic production) should be levied on intermediates. Only general 
consumption taxes ought to be imposed. 
Rule 2. Under the same circumstances as in rule 1, if the only taxes 
which can be levied are trade taxes, then the output of intermediate goods 
should not be changed from what it would be at international prices. 
Goods which are used both as inputs into production and as consumption 
goods should be taxed (if it is impossible to treat the same good differently 
according to use). 
Rule 3. In an economy where profits are not completely taxed away, 
both consumption and trade taxes should be employed. Imported inter- 
mediate goods should not be taxed if they can be treated differently 
from the (same) domestically produced intermediate goods; otherwise 
they should be. 
Rule 4. If profits are not taxed at 100 percent, and firms are foreign 
owned, then the production tax ought to be such as to reduce the output 
of all commodities by the same percentage; the tax is independent of the 
desire of the government for tax revenue (see eq. [3.16]). 
The following rules provide the detailed form of the tax and tariff 
structure (for small taxes) under the assumption of a "representative" 
consumer. The exact formulae that are valid regardless of the size of the 
revenue are given by the equations in parentheses in the text. 
Rule 5. If there is no budget constraint, no foreign exchange con- 
straint, no quotas, and no commodity whose tariff responds unoptimally 
to the level of import or public production, and if it is feasible to impose 
both consumption and production taxes,47 then the tariffs and export 
duties should be such that the consumption of all commodities is reduced 
(along the compensated demand curve) by the same percentage from 
what it would have been had international prices been charged (eqq. 
[2.18] and [3.6]). 
Rule 6. If profits are not taxed at all and all firms are domestically 
owned, then there should be a tax on domestic production such that the 
output of all commodities is reduced exactly by the same percentage as 
that of the consumption of all commodities due to the trade taxes48 (see 
eq. [3.8]). 
47 The same qualifications apply to rules 6 and 7. 
48 As we noted earlier, intermediate goods are treated just like final goods. Recall 
that we are treating outputs and inputs symmetrically. 
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Rule 7. If only trade can be taxed and there is no profit tax, then the 
trade taxes ought to be chosen so as to reduce "excess demand" of each 
commodity by the same percentage (again along the compensated demand 
curve) from what it would have been had international prices been 
charged (eq. [4.4]). If firms are foreign owned, the relative reduction in 
excess demand should be smaller the smaller is the ratio of excess demand 
to domestic private production (eq. [4.8]). If there is 100 percent profit 
taxation, then the reduction in excess demand should be inversely 
proportional to the ratio of excess demand to consumption49 (eq. [4.8a]). 
Rule 8. If some tariffs (export duties) are fixed, then the remaining 
duties ought to be chosen with a view to seeing that the consumption of 
commodities for which trade taxes can be varied is reduced by the same 
percentage (along the compensated demand curve) from what it would 
have been had international prices for all commodities been charged.50 
Rule 9. If there is a quota on commodity k or if the level of tariff on 
k is an increasing function of the net import of k, then the tariffs are chosen 
so as to ensure that the consumption of complements of k is reduced by 
more than is the consumption of substitutes. 
The rules for the evaluation of projects in the private sector are con- 
siderably more complicated. Typical of the kind of results available is 
the following; for the case where trade taxes are given and profits are 
untaxed, the profits, valued at domestic prices must be greater than the 
foreign exchange cost (valued at international prices) times the shadow 
price of foreign exchange in terms of domestic consumption. 
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